viet. After a long discussion, the Soviet decided to give up the struggle for the eight-hour workday. This was an unambiguous recognition of defeat.

The sober resolution moved by the Executive Committee was free from the customary revolutionary phraseology. It declared that reduction of hours of work was a national problem and could not be solved by the St. Petersburg workers alone against the united forces of employers and government, and it urged the workers to abstain from offhand actions. Where working hours had been reduced, the gain should be maintained. Individual plants that had not been able to obtain concessions from the employer could continue the campaign at their own risk. A general offensive had to be postponed.

The lockout spread. Each day brought new layoffs. Shops that were at the forefront in the October and November strikes closed first. Factory meetings became rare. Instead, endless conferences were held in search of an answer to the question: How could the workers compel an employer to resume operations or rehire the laid-off employees?

The Soviet convened again on November 13. Some delegates demanded a new strike. The great majority were against it. It was decided to issue an appeal to the public—a tactic of the liberals that the leftist parties had frequently ridiculed! The Soviet was losing ground. The activity of the Executive Committee was reduced to the distribution of relief. Small amounts were handed out to individual workers on the recommendation of factory delegates. Endless files of applicants besieged the headquarters.

Yet the revolution had not been crushed. On November 13, a revolt of sailors broke out in Sebastopol on the Black Sea. Lieutenant Peter P. Shmidt, an idealist with moderate rather than revolutionary leanings, was proclaimed High Commander of the Black Sea fleet. If this revolt had come two weeks earlier, during the November strike in St. Petersburg, it might have been supported by masses of people all over Russia and have ended in the final victory of the revolution. But it came too late, when the movement in St. Petersburg was at its low ebb, and workers in Moscow and other large cities were smarting from the humiliation of having been unable to support St. Petersburg and Kronstadt. The Sebastopol revolt was put down promptly, and Lieutenant Shmidt, who had used all his temporary authority to prevent bloodshed in the fleet and had saved the lives of hundreds of naval officers, was seized and executed.

The Executive Committee of the Soviet tried desperately to establish contacts with Moscow, the unions of railroad and post and telegraph employees, and, most of all, with the peasant unions that were emerging in different parts of Russia. It was too late, however.